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This paper presents error correction estimates of a simple interdependent model
of the labour market using monthly data over 1990-1994 for the industrial sector
in Poland and Hungary. The aim is to investigate three issues in the performance
of labour markets during transition. First, is there a stable labour market
equilibrium or do high unemployment rates across the region indicate hysteresis?
Second, has the intensity of employment adjustment increased with progress in
institutional reforms that strengthened corporate governance at the enterprise
level? Third, what governs the evolution of real wages and to what extent is there
evidence for strong insider power in the labour market? The results reveal striking
differences between Poland and Hungary. The former exhibits hysteresis and
evidence for considerable insider power while the latter has experienced
adjustment towards a stable labour market equilibrium. The intensity of
adjustment, however, is high in both countries over the sample period and fails to
respond to the initiation of institutional reforms.
Keywords: Hysteresis, Adjustment Intensity, Insider Power
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1. Introduction
Labour markets play a central role in the process of economic transition in
Central and Eastern Europe. First, the labour market has to cope both with the
legacy of considerable overemployment in the state-owned enterprise sector
(Brada, 1989; Rutkowski, 1990) and the dramatic shift of the relative price
vector, implying a reallocation of labour from industry and agriculture to services
and within sectors from energy intensive production to those branches more in
line with the region's comparative advantages (Hare and Hughes, 1991; Boeri and
Keese, 1992). Second, inflation in reforming socialist economies has traditionally
been cost driven (Commander and Coricelli, 1991). Wage restraint is thus not
only warranted to prevent mass redundancies but also to support stabilisation
policies in transition economies (Coricelli and Revenga, 1992).
For most observers, labour markets in Central Eastern Europe are not well
equipped to effect such deep adjustments. Thus it is argued that institutional
weaknesses pertain at the level of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) where a lack of
corporate governance sponsors short-termism. Ailing SOEs have continued
access to a deficient capital market (Begg and Portes, 1992) and the legacy of
worker control poses the danger of "wage drift". The result is a hypothesised
sluggishness of labour demand in reacting to the dramatic output falls in the
region and a policy of wage setting decoupled from productivity developments
(Agion, Blanchard and Burgess, 1993; Schmieding, 1993). Such pessimism has
This paper was written with financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation which is
greatfully acknowledged. Thanks to Rolf J. Langhammer and Rainer Thiele for comments
on an earlier draft.found support in the experience of Western Europe with high and persistent
unemployment after the second oil shock in 1979 (Bean, 1994). Thus militant
wage bargaining and institutional rigidities are often blamed for the sluggish
recovery of investment and the effective segmentation of Western European
labour markets into the employed "insiders" and the unemployed "outsiders"
(Lindbeck and Snower, 1987). The strength of labour unions, for instance in
Poland, has consequently raised the spectre of post-socialist stagflation.
More recently, results from enterprise survey data have led to a more optimistic
assessment of enterprise adjustment in transition economies (Pinto et al., 1993;
Pinto and v. Wijnbergen, 1994; Estrin, Gelb and Singh, 1994). Thus, the initial
output shock was cushioned by a remarkable downward flexibility of real wages
(Calvo and Coricelli, 1992). Subsequently, SOEs have shed substantial amounts
of labour. Accordingly, the current question is whether wage moderation can be
maintained to allow for a recovery of profits and investment and whether labour
markets are sufficiently flexible to reintegrate those who lost their jobs in the
initial slump.
This paper provides an analysis of labour demand and supply in Poland and
Hungary at the level of aggregate industry using monthly data from 1990:1
through 1995:3. The analysis is restricted to industry as it arguably faces the
strongest adjustment pressures. First, we examine whether a stable equilibrium
exists in the Polish and Hungarian labour markets. We test for the presence of a
unit root in an interdependent model of labour demand and supply, specified in
the dynamic error correction form. Absence of a labour market equilibrium
implies unemployment persistence. Subsequently, we look at the parameters of
the functional forms separately to identify periods of accelerated adjustment in
labour demand and analyse the specific role of insider forces in wage
determination. The results point at a stable labour market equilibrium only in the
case of Hungary. In Poland, we find that unemployment fails to exert anyinfluence on real wages and hence the system of wages and employment has a
unit root. Moreover, wage formation in Poland is compatible with enterprise
behaviour under labour management, while wages in Hungary seem to be set on a
competitive labour market. These differences are finally borne out by
substantially lower wage and output elasticities of employment in the Polish case.
With respect to the intensity of adjustment we find that labour demand has
reacted only little to institutional changes, suggesting that the overall consistency
of the reform programmes in both countries was the dominant force in SOE
behaviour.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section presents
some stylised facts of labour market adjustment in Poland and Hungary. These
are related to the progress with macroeconomic and institutional reforms which
uncovers some notable differences in the two countries. The main part of the
paper presents the empirical model and derives the hypotheses to be tested
(section three) and proceeds to results (section four). The fifth section concludes.
2. Labour Markets and the Transition in Poland and Hungary: An
Overview
Among the four stylised macro-economic facts that have characterised economic
transition in Central and Eastern Europe so far, three concern the behaviour of
output, employment and wages (Calvo and Coricelli, 1992). First, output has
collapsed with the start of economic reforms while recovery has set in after two
or three years of transitionary recession. Thereby, the industrial sector has been
by far the most important component of the fall in GDP and its share in national
income has been progressively reduced. Second, employment has followed output
declines with a lag, leading to an initial drop in labour productivity and a gradual
rise in unemployment. Third, real wages have fallen in the initial stages of
transition, thereby cushioning the effect of the decline of output on profitabilityand employment. Fourth, as unit labour costs and unemployment have risen, fiscal
balances have turned strongly negative and inflation has subsided only gradually.
Within this general pattern, significant inter-country differences should be noted
(see Appendix II, Table Al). Poland has suffered from transitionary recession in
two blows, following the introduction of the shock reform programme in 1990
and the disintegration of the CMEA in 1991. Since the beginning of 1992,
industrial output and GDP are increasing.
1 In Hungary, the decline in industrial
production has proceeded more gradually over 1989-1992 in line with the phased
introduction of economic reforms. Nonetheless, the cumulative extent of
production losses has been very similar in both countries amounting to 36 per
cent of the 1989 level in Poland in 1991 and 34 per cent in Hungary in 1992. A
more fundamental difference may be noted in the adjustment of industrial
employment. This is plotted in Figures 1 and 2 which show the development of
labour productivity, real producer and consumer wages and unemployment in
both countries over the 1990-94 period (see Appendix III). Hungarian industry
has shed labour far more rapidly and extensively than Polish industry and hence
labour productivity declined by only 10 per cent over 1989-91, against almost 30
per cent in Poland. The onset of industrial recovery has led to an increase in
labour productivity in Hungarian industry in 1994 to 136 per cent of the 1989
level by 1994, while Poland had only just recovered its 1989 productivity level by
that date. The developments of real product wages (nominal wages deflated with
the producer price index) mirror the differences in labour productivity. As a
result, unit labour costs in industry have increased sharply in both countries until
1 We should mention that growth has been private sector driven as can be seen from the shifts
in ownership structure presented in Table A2 (see Appendix II). The importance of the
private sector in total employment at the start of transition was highest in Poland and
Hungary among the countries in the region, a fact that very probably impacted positively on
enterprise adjustment in both economies.the second half of 1994 when the steep increase in labour productivity was able
to catch up with previous real wage increases.
Two further aspects should be noted in Figures 1 and 2. The first is the increasing
divergence of real consumer and producer wages, reflecting much higher
consumer than producer price inflation in both countries. The reason for this
"price wedge" partly lies in the continuing real appreciation of the forint and the
zloty, lowering the price of imported industrial inputs and in administrative price
increases in rents and public utilities, driving up the cost of living. The extent to
which unit labour costs were affected by the attempt of workers to maintain their
real incomes will be addressed below as an important aspect of wage behaviour.
Suffice to note here that industrial workers in Hungary have by and large
maintained their average 1989 incomes while their Polish counterparts have had
to cope with a decline of the order of 20-25 per cent with little sign of
improvements. The second aspect is the rapid increase in unemployment from
virtually zero to well over 10 per cent of the labour force. Interestingly,
unemployment in Hungary has been falling since early 1993 whereas it was still
increasing in Poland at the end of 1994.
2 Whether the rise in unemployment
signals the presence of labour market rigidities and the persistence of disequilibria
in Poland and Hungary is a central issue to be investigated below.
Summing up the differences in labour market adjustment emerging from Figures 1
and 2, it would appear that Poland has opted for a combination of employment
and wage reductions compatible with a significant role for labour management
and insider dominated adjustment strategies (Lane, 1994), while labour market
adjustment in Hungary has been primarily effectuated by employment reductions,
suggesting substantial inter-sectoral labour mobility and competitive wage
2 The higher unemployment rate in Poland may be largely attributed to the dramatic fall in
agricultural employment, which in Poland accounted for a much larger share of the labour
force than in other countries of the region.formation. How can we account for such differences? One answer may lie in the
general policy framework, including institutional arrangements in both countries.
3
In Poland, the key to the stabilisation and reform programme introduced in
January 1990 was the end of fiscal subsidies to SOEs and a very restrictive
monetary policy that was to prevent price liberalisation from ensuing into another
hyper-inflationary spiral. This was amended with an incomes policy (popiwek)
that taxed the total wage sum of an enterprise in excess of a given norm. In spite
of several government changes, the broad direction of reform has been maintained
in Poland ever since with an emphasis on macro-economic demand management.
Institutional reforms have progressed slowly, particularly in the area of
privatisation. Management buy-outs under the provisions for liquidation of state
enterprises have often put workers councils and former enterprise directors
effectively in control of their firms. An important change in corporate governance
occurred in the fourth quarter of 1991, when state-owned commercial banks were
brought under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Finance (Pinto and van
Wijnbergen, 1994).
The focus on macro-economic stabilisation and the delay in clarifying corporate
governance structures may explain the pattern of labour market adjustment
sketched above. Forced to undertake immediate adjustments but without a clear
long term adjustment plan, Polish SOEs initially "borrowed" from their workers
while waiting for a loosening of macro-economic control (Pinto, Belka and
Krajewski, 1993). The popiwek supported such an adjustment strategy aimed at
minimising redundancies. Moreover, the predominance of insider privatisation
may have strengthened the preference for employment security over current
For references see Gomulka (1992) in the case of Poland and Szekhely and Newberry for
Hungary (1993); also Buch et al. (1994).incomes among workers, as would be expected under a system of labour
management where property rights are linked to employment.
4
Economic reforms in Hungary proceeded more gradually than in Poland. Price
and trade liberalisation were accelerated during the late 1980s and merely
completed during 1989-1991. As price changes were far less accentuated both in
relative and absolute terms, monetary policy could afford to be less restrictive.
Thus institutional reforms occupied a more important place on the reform agenda
in Hungary. Privatisation was initiated early on through direct auction sales. This
helped to trigger the largest inflow of foreign direct investment in the region and
contained the role of insiders in the process, although a marked slow-down
occurred in 1991 (Heinrich, 1993a). In response to increasing evidence for
creditor passivity in the banking system (Estrin, Hare and Suranyi, 1992), a new
bankruptcy law was put in place in January 1992 together with Western
accounting standards for state-owned commercial banks.
The absence of hyperinflation and the legacy of very tight demand management in
Hungary during the late 1980s (Brada and Dobozi, 1990) meant that there was
less political will but also less scope for a substantial reduction in workers'
incomes. Hungarian SOEs started shedding labour as early as 1989, partly
induced by the generous system of unemployment benefits (Burda, 1993).
5 The
4 For a review of the theoretical literature, see Ireland and Law (1982). Belka et al. (1994)
report qualitative evidence on the substantial role of worker councils in both SOEs and
privatised enterprises.
5 According to the EBRD (1993), Hungarian employers have to pay non wage labour costs
to the amount of 52.5 percent of gross wages (including 44 percent contributions to social
security system, 7 percent for unemployment compensation fund and 1.5 for the
employment fund). The employees' portion of payroll taxes amounts to 10 percent of gross
wage for social security and to 2 percent for the unemployment compensation fund. This
has obvious employment deterring effects. The implicit tax wedge (gross wage minus net
wage) rose from 85 percent in 1991 to 100 percent of the net wage in 1993 (KSH, var.
issues). Since 1994 the tax wedge shows a downward trend. In March 1995, the new
Hungarian government substantially dismantled the current benefit system. The tax wedge
in Poland amounts to 80 percent.additional impact of the bankruptcy law remains debated. While most observers
would argue that it provided for a further substantial hardening of budget
constraints on Hungarian SOEs, Bonin and Schaffer (1994) claim that banks had
changed their lending behaviour as early as 1991. The micro-economic evidence
is similarly inconclusive. Brada, Singh and Tbrbk (1994) claim that a substantial
proportion of Hungarian enterprises even after 1992 were "drifting", i.e. adjusting
with a mere view to short term survival. By contrast, Estrin, Gelb and Singh
(1994) report results from a different survey indicating that most Hungarian firms
had long term adjustment plans in place (see also Heinrich, 1993b). Importantly,
the latter source also noted a significantly lesser role of worker councils in
management decisions in Hungarian SOEs than in their Polish counterparts.
The general policy environment gives some clues to differences in the pattern of
employment and wages since the start of transition. The impact of specific
institutional reforms on the intensity and speed of adjustment, however, remains
an issue of contention. The following section formalises the above observations in
a dynamic model of the labour market that allows to test simultaneously for the
existence of an equilibrium adjustment path, changes in adjustment over time and
the role of insiders in wage determination.
3. A Dynamic Model of the Labour Market in Transition
In this section we construct a simple model of the labour market.
Labour demand:
Starting from a CES Production function
8Kr
p + (l-5)L,-
p] withp = —,
a
one obtains the loglinear labour demand function
1-p+pv
(2) 1, =c + dq,-o(w-p ), withd =where q is the measure of output in industry at constant prices, 1 is the number of
workers in industry and w is the gross monthly wage in industry (including
employers' contributions to social insurance, income taxes and pensions).
6 The
price of gross output is the producer price index pp. All variables are measured in
logs. Under the restriction of constant returns to scale (v=l) it follows that d=l,
and equation (2) may be rewritten as the relationship of labour productivity to the
real wage. The coefficient o is the substitution elasticity between capital and
labour. It may vary across countries and/or industries. However, once o is given
by a technological assumption (e.g. o = 1 for the Cobb Douglas case), a lower
estimate for o may also indicate allocative inefficiency.
7
If labour demand is not in long run equilibrium in every period but the adjustment
process takes time due to adjustment costs or reaction lags, the appropriate
formulation is a generalised lag model, which we transform into the familiar error
correction representation.
(3)
Alt=X[lt_1+a(w-pp)l_1-dq1_,-c]+D0(L)All_1+D1(L)A(w-pp)l + D2(L)lAql The coefficient X denotes the impact of the error correction term, which ensures
that employment moves into the direction of its long term equilibrium, provided
that X is significantly negative. Further, by tracing the value of A, over time, we
may test for the effects of particular reforms on the adjustment speed of labour
6 In principle, q should be real value added. However, for the whole period value added data
are only available on an annual basis. For both countries we take a monthly average of net
value added at factor cost in 1993 (1991 in Hungary) and multiply it with the industrial
production series (see Appendix I). This is unlikely to be serious if one takes in mind the
following considerations. For one, in Poland industrial production data varies only slightly
from value added (Kennedy 1994). For another, annual data in Hungary and Poland indicate
that the value added deflator is closer to the producer price index than to the consumer
price index.
7 An application is provided by Burda and Funke (1993) for the case of West and East
German manufacturing.10
demand. We should note that the short time span under study imposes a cautious
interpretation of the level coefficients. We are interested in equation (3) as a
representation of an equilibrium adjustment path rather than as the state of rest in
the labour market. Finally, D;(L) are polynomials in the lag operator L and
D;(L)Ax capture the shortrun effects to the system.
Labour supply:
As a specification of labour supply, we use a real wage equation in terms of the
real product wage written in error correction form
(4) A(w-pp) = a()[(w-pp).1-a,(pc-pp)_I -a2(q-l)_,-a3+a4U_1] + B,,(L)A(w-pp).1+B1(L)A(pc-pp) + B2(L)A(q-l)
with Bi(L)Axi = bi0Axi + buAx^, + bi2Axt_2 + +b_rAxt_r.
As with labour demand, a significantly negative estimate of oto indicates that
wage setting moves towards long run equilibrium as defined by the error
correction term. However, this is not sufficient to reject hysteresis in the labour
market. Thus, the system of employment and wage equations has a unit root if the
coefficient on unemployment (04) is insignificantly different from zero (Hansen,
1991). A cointegration relationship between the real wage, productivity and
relative prices implies a stable wage equation without any feedback from labour
demand.
The error correction term in brackets reflects the hypothesis that a linear
combination of real product and real consumer wages is controlled by labour
productivity. The higher the coefficient oc2 the stronger the link between the levels
of real wages and productivity. Following Franz and Gordon (1993), an oc2 equal
to unity is the core of the real wage bargaining model (for a classification see Coe
(1990)). This implies that as productivity declines, workers accept wage cuts
rather than redundancies, while in a boom wage increases leave little room for
recovery of profitability. An estimate of a2 therefore conveys important11
information about the rationale of union behaviour in transition economies and the
likelihood that recovery will create new jobs in the industrial sector. The evidence
in Section 2 suggests that a2 should be considerably higher in Poland than in
Hungary.
The price wedge variable (pc-pp) indicates to what extent consumer prices are
relevant for the suppliers of labour.
8 In the case of a, = 1, the long-run functional
relationship is in terms of the real consumer wage, whereas with a, =0 wage
bargaining is totally oriented at the producers' profitability conditions. This can
be conveniently related to wage behaviour under labour management. Thus, if
workers are at the same time owners they face a trade-off between the real
consumer wage and the residual income on their assets. It has been shown that if
these assets are not tradable, real wages will decline as a result of a negative
terms of trade shock while employment will increase (Ward, 1957; Ireland and
Law, 1982). Hence, a coefficient a] considerably below unity may be taken as
indication for labour management and be related to the predominance of insider
privatisation noted above. Thus, the combination of a high value for a2 with a
relatively low value of o^ indicates an insider dominated adjustment strategy,
while in the opposite case, real wages are determined by intersectoral competition
in the labour market so that sectoral productivity and cost developments do not
play a particular role. It is likely that a strong role for insiders will also lead to the
failure of labour markets to clear.
Finally, in the case of a2 = l, a,=0 and a4 = (), the error-correction term
constitutes the deviation of labour's share from its target level a3 (see, for
example, Franz and Gordon 1993). If a4 remains significant in labour supply
equilibrium, the long term target real wage declines when unemployment rises.
8 We do not include the tax wedge (gross wage minus net wage) in equation (4). There are
several reasons for doing so. For one, in Poland personal income tax was introduced in
January 1992. Second, in Hungary in 1990-1991 the net wage is not available on monthly
basis.12
Below, we do present estimates of equilibrium labour shares obtained from the
restricted version of equation (4). However, as the restriction cannot be accepted
statistically, most of our analysis concentrates on interpreting the values of a, and
u2 and (t4 in the unrestricted model.
4. Estimation and Results
4.1. The Interdependent Model
As a first step before beginning with estimation, an augmented Dickey-Fuller-test
is applied in order to determine the order of integration of all logarithmic
transformed variables (Table 1). Only for the price wedge in the case of Poland
and for the unemployment rate in Hungary the null of non-stationarity can be
rejected which is equivalent to the result that the price wedge and the
unemployment rate follow a stationary process, whereas all other variables are
1(1) without drift, since they become stationary upon being differenced once.
9
If there exists a long run equilibrium relationship between the variables, a linear
combination of them which reflects this relationship has to be stationary. This is
equivalent to saying that the deviation of actual observations from their
equilibrium relationship does not grow over time. Following the reasoning of
Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado (1992) we do a test of cointegration by means of
error correction equations for both labour demand and labour supply (Table 2).
The null of no cointegration is rejected if the corresponding adjustment
9 The asymptotic properties ot the OLS estimate depend on whether or not a constant or a
time trend is included in the regression (Hamilton, 1994, pp. 529). Panel 1 in Table 1
presents results with a constant, panel 2 with a time trend. Critical t- and F-values are given
below the Table. The time trend is significant in two cases, so in Poland output and labour
productivity are characterised by a random walk without drift, but with trend.13 Bibliothekdes Institute
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Time range is 1990(1) - 1995(3) for Poland and 1990(1) - 1994(12) for
Hungary. The lag-lenth is determined by the FPE criteria. * Significant at
the 5 percent level.
 a
c Critical values at the 5 percent level are t=-2.93 and
t= -3.49.
 M Critical values at the 5 percent level are F= 4.83 and F= 6.73.14
Table 2- Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado (1992) Test for Co-
integration: F-values
a





aH0: X = 0 against Hi: X<()
Ho: d0 =0 against Hj: Xo <().
A single (double) asterisk indicates that the null hypothesis is
rejected with 90 (95) percent confidence.
coefficient is significantly negative.
1
0 For both Poland and Hungary we find
stable employment and wage equations.
1
1
One problem with independent estimation of the labour demand and supply
functions can arise if the explanatory variables in each equation are not weakly
exogenous to the cointegration parameters. In this case, arguing for the labour
demand equation, not only labour demand but also an explanatory variable in this
equation like the real wage reacts to disequilibrium as expressed by the error
correction term.
1
2 Indeed, we find that the Hungarian price wedge in labour
supply is the only variable to be weakly exogenous in our model (see Appendix
IV, Table A3). The consequence is that independent estimation, although being
superconsistent due to the fact that all level variables are integrated of order 1, is
no longer efficient.
1
3 This is particularly serious in the case of a small number of
observations and may thus bias the estimates of the single structural equations.
1
0 Critical values were calculated by Banerjee et al. (1992). The Null-hypothesis of no
cointegration is rejected at 5 percent if the t-ratio is smaller than the critical values of -3.57
and -3.82 for two and three explanatory variables respectively.
1 • OLS estimates of the single equations are available from the author upon request.
1
2 The same reasoning applies to productivity in the labour supply equation.
1
3 Furthermore, inference cannot be conducted with standard tables (Banerjee et al., 1993, pp.
163,244).15
We thus formulate and estimate an interdependent model of the labour market to
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Ax, Bo (L)A(w - p)t_,, B, (L)Alt_,, B2 (L)Aq
s(L)A(w-p)l_1,B4(L)A(q-l)l_1,Bs(L)A(pc-pr
and Bj(L)Axt = b^Ax,+ bi,Axl_,+bi2Ax,_2+ +birAxt r.
Efficiency is increased since we make use of more restrictions of orthogonality
than when estimating the structural form equations (Hansen, 1993, pp. 183).
Compared with single estimation of the ECM, the following interdependent
estimation produces smaller standard errors (particularly for the adjustment
coefficients) and leads to only little changes of the estimated coefficients.
Three stage least square estimation of model (5) yielded equation (6) and (8) for




4 If we had investigated total national employment, we should have explained unemployment
via the relation U=labour force - 1, thereby taking account of a another feedback from
labour demand. With the industrial sector alone, this restriction does not hold, so we treat U
as exogenous. Note that we still assume output to be (weakly) exogenous. This is in line
with the supply shock interpretation of output falls in Central and Eastern Europe (van
Long and Siebert, 1992; Winiecki, 1993).
'5 For Hungary and Poland following instruments are used:
const. q_i, L,,(w-pp).i, U.i, (pc-pP)-i, Aq.2, Aq.8, A(q-1).3, A(q-1).4, A(q-1)_5, A(q-l)..,, A1.2, A(pc- pp), A(pc-pP)^, A(w-pp), A(w-pp).,, A(w-pp).2) A(w-pp)-3, A(w-pp)^, A(w-pp).5 and const, q.,, l.|,(w-pp).,, U.i, (pc-pP)-i, Aq.2) Aq.8, A(q-l)_i, A(q-1).2, A(q-1).3) Al.t, A1.2, A(pc-pp), A(w-pp).|, A(w-pp).3) ACw-pp)^.16
Poland Labour demand 1990.1-1995.3
(6)
Al = — 0.13 I 1 , + ().45(w - pn) , - 0.36 q .- 5.23 const]- 0.08 Aq ,
| (-5.04) [_ (7..14) ' (-A.45) (-8.64) J (-2.44)
+ 0.04Aq 8-O.4()Al , -0.27 Al ,+0.()6A(w - p )
(1.26) ( 1.75) (-2.34) (3.06)
 P
R
2 =0.47, a(LM( 1)) = ().16,a(LM(12)) = 0.06,ADF(3) = -3.70.
Hungary Labour demand 1990.1 -1994.12
Al =- 0.14 I 1 , + 1.06(w-pJ , -O.85q , -0.31 const 1 -0.13 Aq 2-0.20Aq .
(-4.06) |_ (7.47) ( -8.09) (-O.2I) J (-2.14) (-3.20)





+ 0.08A(w-p )4+0.09A(w-p )5
(2.(K)) ' (2.05)
R
2 =0.71, a(LM(l)) = 0.15, <x(LM(12)) = 0.83, ADF(3) =-5.06
Poland labour supply 1990.1-1995.3
A(w-p ) = -().55[(w-pp) ,-0.3()(q-l) , - 0.53(pc - p ) , - 0.32 U ,- 0.95 const]
(-7.I5)|_ (-6.73) (-3.04)
 P (-0.58) (-11.83) J
(8) +O.38A.(w-pD) .+0.29A(w-pJ 3-0.42A(q-l) ,-0.32A(q-I) ,
(4.89) ' (3.81)
 P (-3.55) (-2.87)





2 = 0.43, a(LM(l) = 0.061, a(LM(12) = 0.18, ADF(3) = -4.43
Hungary labour supply 1990.1-1994.12
(9)
A(w-p ) = -0.93 (w-pj , -0.17(q-l) , - l.()3(pc-pj . +0.52U . + 2.16 const
( 8.2)1) [_ ' ( .1.64) ( 8.07)
 P (3.35) (10.64)
+ O.32A(q-l) 3 + 0.48 A(q - 1) 4 + U.38A(q-l) 5 + O.37A(q-l) „+0.23A(w-pD) , (5)8) (4.11) (3.68) (3.61) (2.44)
+ 0.34A(w-p)2+().24A(w-p) 3 + 1.15A(pc-p,,)+1.23A(pc-pp).4 (4)1) ' (1.35) ' (4.08) ' (4.59)
 P
R
2 =0.73, a(LM(l)) = 0.15, a(LM(12)) = 0.57, ADF(4) = -4.69
The first thing to note, is that a4 remains insignificant in Poland, inspite of the
fact that both the employment and wage equations show a significantly negative
The long-run coefficients are taken from the instrumental variable estimation of the Bewley-
transformation of the ECM. The lag-length of the short-run variables is detennined with the
procedure 'Stepwise Regression' in RATS. The number in parenthesis is the t-statistic.17
adjustment coefficient.
1
6 Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis of hysteresis in
the Polish labour market and must interpret equations (6) and (8) separately.
Equation (8) thereby embodies a wage equation, where real product wages in
industry are only controlled by relative prices and sectoral productivity growth. In
Hungary, the semi-elasticity of real product wages to the rate of unemployment is
statistically significant and its value is roughly 0.5. The size and significance of
the adjustment coefficients in Hungary further confirm the existence of a flexible
adjustment mechanism along a stable equilibrium path.
This striking difference between the Polish and Hungarian results concurs well
with the observations made in Section 2. However, we should not overinterpret
our findings. The short time span under study does not allow for the conclusion of
deep-seated and long-lasting differences in the two countries labour markets. We
now proceed to a detailed discussion of the results for labour demand and labour
supply separately. In the first case, we are particularly interested in possible
structural parameter shifts corresponding to the major institutional breaking points
in Poland and Hungary, namely the financial recentralisation of October 1991 in
the former and the enforcement of bankruptcy since April 1992 in the latter
country. Our interest in the labour supply equation is to test for insider power
along the lines set out in Section 2 above.
4.2. Labour Demand and Institutional Change
With estimated adjustment coefficients of -0.13 in Poland and -0.14 in Hungary,
labour demand reacts to a considerable degree to disequilibrium if one takes into
account that the model was estimated on a monthly basis. We therefore have
strong evidence that both Polish and Hungarian firms have adjusted labour
demand quite rapidly since the start of economic transition. This contradicts the
lf> This result also holds if we replace U with 1 in equation (8) and include the tax wedge in the
error-correction term. The finding of hysteresis in the Polish labour market seems to be
robust.18
pessimism of some observers and confirms the depth of the systemic changes
under way in both countries.
Next, we address the question whether the intensity of adjustment increased after
specific institutional reforms. Crucial dates are October 1991 in Poland and April
1992 in Hungary. For empirical investigation we conduct the estimation of labour
demand recursively by adding one observation in each step and reiterating
computation of X (Graph 1).
Graph 1 - Recursive Estimation of the Adjustment Coefficient (k)





For Poland we have a strong confirmation that adjustment intensity rises con-
siderably in November 1991, but falls back again during the year 1992. Whereas
the first aspect coincides with what we expect, the decline in adjustment after
March 1992 is somewhat of a puzzle. We suggest that banking reform in Poland
had the effect of a one-off acceleration of adjustment. It is unclear, however,
whether this was sufficient to eliminate all overemployment in Polish industry.
In Hungary, by contrast, A, remained constant at a considerably higher level in
1992 until September, fell sharply until the end of the year and showed no ten-
dency to change afterwards. Therefore,we reach the conclusion that a great deal19
of adjustment had been done long before the implementation of the bankruptcy
law, which obviously proved to be quite ineffective with regard to the labour
market.
A test for a structural break in the value of the adjustment coefficient reveals no
significant differences in the time period following the reforms from the period
before. The relevant break points and F-statistics are given in Table 3.
1
7




dl= 91.10-92.6,dl*l-i F(1.48)=0.13 (0.71)
a Number in parenthesis is the marginal significance level.
The result of no structural break holds for both Hungary and Poland. We
therefore conclude that even for Poland the temporarily higher adjustment
coefficient induced no permanent change in the intensity of adjustment.
Concerning the functional form of labour demand, in Hungary we observe quite a
good approximation of a Cobb-Douglas technology, although the restrictions d=l
and a=l are jointly rejected by a Likelihood ratio test at the 5 percent level of
significance (see Appendix V, Table A4). Nevertheless, the early beginning of
gradual reforms in Hungary and the dual structure of its labour market during the
1980s might have moved the country closer to long-run equilibrium prior to the
reforms than was the case for other countries of the region (Sokil, 1990).
In Poland, the response of labour demand to both output and real wage changes is
quite low (d=0.36, CT=-0.45) although the coefficients are significant and show the
right sign. A recent study by Franz (1995) finds nearly the same elasticities
1
7 Following Graph 1, we chose October 1991 - June 1992 and June 1992 - December 1992 as
our relevant break points for Poland and Hungary respectively. In the latter country we thus
allow for a two month lag since the enforcement of bankruptcy in April 1992.20
(d=0.38, G=-0.46).
1
8 A plausible explanation might be that the strong role of in-
siders in Polish enterprises has limited the downward flexibility of employment in
industries dominated by insiders (see Bufda and Funke, 1993). In this sense,
assuming similar technologies in Poland and Hungary, the lower estimates of real
wage and output elasticities could indicate higher allocative inefficiency in Polish
industry. This contention leads us to wage determination and the question
whether the results of the wage equation confirm the larger role for insiders in the
Polish labour market.
4.3. Labour Supply and the Role of Insiders
Both in Poland and Hungary the clear significance of the adjustment coefficient
indicates that the real product wage tends to equilibrium defined by the
explanatory variables in the labour supply equation. The coefficient on the error
correction term in the Hungarian labour supply equation does only slightly differ
from one, so current real wages are fully corrected for past errors. Further, a test
of the hypothesis of equal coefficients on employment (1) and output (q) is
accepted and labour productivity enters the wage equation with a single
coefficient (Appendix V, Table A4, A5). The most interesting results, however,
concern the differences in the size of the estimated parameters of the structural
form in Hungary and Poland.
With a2 equal to 0.30 in Poland and 0.17 in Hungary, wage setting in the first
country is more oriented at sectoral productivity than in the latter. Moreover, the
coefficient on the price wedge is near unity in Hungary, but only 0.53 in Poland.
The hypothesis a, = 1 is rejected for Poland, but not for Hungary.
1
9 Both results
are supportive of the hypothesis of insider dominated adjustment in Polish
1
8 Using a partial adjustment model, fixed effects panel estimates for all four Visegrad
countries indicate relatively low long-run elasticities, with coefficients of 0.21 and -0.26
respectively (Franz, 1995). This contrasts with our results for Hungary. Our long-run
elasticites for this country are much higher (d=0.85, a=-1.06).
1
9 See Appendix V, Table A4 column 4, Table A5 column 5.21
enterprises following our reasoning in Section 3. The higher elasticity of real
producer wages to labour productivity and the partial cushioning of terms of trade
shocks in Poland, has reduced the pressure for lay-offs but thereby has lowered
the speed at which structural change occurs. Moreover, together with the absence
of wage moderating effects of unemployment, the insider dominated adjustment
pattern is likely to limit employment creation during recovery, a result that does
not contain much hope for Poland's currently 15 per cent unemployed. In
Hungary, the wage in industry is more determined outside the sector itself. In this
context it is interesting to note that the expansion of the service sector has been
considerable in Hungary. Hence employment opportunities in services and
corresponding prospects of remuneration may have contributed to this sort of
outsider influence on wages.
Finally, note that the restriction of <x2 = 1 is rejected for both countries, so that the
error correction mechanism cannot be expressed in terms of the labour share (see
Appendix V, Table A4, A5). If one still follows this path of interpretation one
obtains equilibrium labour shares in net value added of 74 and 78 per cent in
Poland and Hungary respectively. Both figures are comparable to Western




In this paper we offer an estimation of labour demand and supply equations on
monthly data for the industrial sector in Poland and Hungary. We find a striking
contrast between Poland and Hungary. In the former country, we cannot reject
the hypothesis of hysteresis in the industrial labour market. In the latter country,
at least for the industrial sector, a labour market equilibrium exists.
2
0 See Appendix V, Table A4, A5 column 2. Pinto et al's (1993) study reveals a labour share
in value added in Polish SOEs ranging from 40 to 80 percent.22
The results for labour demand alone, point towards significantly higher employ-
ment adjustment in both countries than predicted by most observers after the ini-
tial transition crisis. Institutional reforms like the Hungarian bankruptcy law did
not have a significant additional impact. The major challenge would seem to lie in
the creation of new jobs. With respect to labour supply, we find interesting dif-
ferences between the two countries, pointing at strong insider forces in Poland in
contrast to Hungary. The former country thereby might have limited labour
shedding in industry with wage moderation, which in view of its high unemploy-
ment rate may not have been undesirable. However, the effective exclusion of the
unemployed from the labour market poses the danger in the future of creating a
pool of long-term unemployment. The finding of large insider power thus com-
plements the result of hysteresis in the industrial labour market. In Hungary, a
substantial reallocation of labour away from industry seems to have occurred. The
resulting transitionary unemployment has provided strong wage moderating
effects, although real wages have responded less to productivity developments.
Finally, the level of aggregation chosen in this paper may cloud the interesting
interaction of institutional legacies, such as insider power, with sub-sectoral
difference such as the extent of the relative price shocks or the degree of labour
market competition (Kennedy 1994). Future research will have to take into
account such structural differences among industrial sectors as important
determinants for the pattern of labour market adjustment in transition economies.
The policy conclusions to be derived from this analysis have to remain
speculative in account of the short time span. Nonetheless, developments in
Poland mirror some of the experience with labour market rigidities in Western
Europe. Strengthening corporate governance structures would seem a high
priority for Poland's insider dominated industrial sector. Hungary's challenge
seems to lie with macroeconomic revival in order to fully absorb those made
redundant by the deep structural change evident in the industrial labour market.23
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Appendix I - Variable description:
All variables except for U arc log transformed. The real product wage (w- p ) is seasonally adjusted.
For the scries real product wage and ip seasonal adjustment is performed in RATS 4.10 using the option
exponential smoothing.
Variable description: Poland
w Nominal wages arc measured as the sum of monthly total wage bill and of non-wage labour
costs divided by I. Monthly total wage bill is the product of average gross monthly nominal
wage in total industry in thousand (old) zlotys and 1. In 1990-1991 GUS-data refer to net wage
(that is after deductions on account of income tax of natural persons).
PP ( P c) Producer (consumer/retail) price index, 1993=100. Since 1994 price indices are calculated on
net prices, that is without VAT.
q Industrial production, 1993=100, seasonally adjusted. Sold production of industry covers
industrial enterprises with more than 5 persons employed.^' q is computed by:
(industrial value added1993I_xn /12)*(ipt 1993=10O / 100). Net value added at factor cost in industry in 1993: 323600 bn (old) zlotys.
2
2
1 Log of industrial employment in numbers (end month). Monthly data on employment (and
wages) cover economic entities with more than 5 persons employed.
U Unemployment rate (adjusted scries). U is expressed as percentage rates. Due to correction of
number of employment in individual agriculture and in the national economy the registered
unemployment rate in 1994 is 0.7 percent above the old scries (in 1994.1 16.7 compared to
16.0).
2
1 Industrial production data in GUS are presented under the Polish Classification of the
national economy (KGN) and since 1992 under European Classification of Activities
(EKD). Starting from 1.1.92 we replace industrial production under KGN by EKD.
2
2 gross value added
- depreciation
- taxes on production
+ subsidies on production
= net value added (GUS 1995a, pp. 64, own calculations).
Depreciation is assumed to be 20 per cent of gross value added.29
Variable description: Hungary
w Nominal wages are measured as the sum of monthly total wage bill and of non-wage labour
costs divided by 1. Monthly total wage bill is the product of average gross monthly nominal
wage in total industry in forint (HUF) and 1. Gross average wage includes personal income tax,
employees' contribution to the social security system and the pension fund, as well as the
contribution to the solidarity fund (for unemployment compensation).
p (p c) Industrial producer price (consumer/retail price) index. 1991=100.
q Industrial production, 1991 = 100, seasonally adjusted. q is computed by:
(industrial value added 1991 [_XII/12) * (ipn i99I=ioo^OO) • Net
 valu
c added at factor cost in
industry in 1991: 532390 millions HUF (619502-19312-67808) (KSH 1993, pp. 45).
1 Industrial employment in numbers (average staff numbers). Adjusted scries due to new
classification. Note that starting from 1.1.93 (1.1.94) industrial employees refer to enterprises
with more than 20 (10) employees.
U Unemployment rate. U is expressed as percentage rates.
Source: GUSa.b, Planecon var. issues, GUS (1995b), OECD (1994), KSH, Planecon var. iss., KSH (1993).30
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" PlanEcon, var. issues. PQS, var. issues. 1993-1994 Data: GUS (1995a, pp. 28). EBRD
(1994). KSH (1993, pp. 123). —" KSH, var. issues. KSH (1993 pp. 123). PQS (1995, pp.
16). Statistical bulletin (1994).—
cEmployment including private agriculture. PQS (1994,
June, pp. 19). KSH (1993a, pp. 123). —
d Employment including private agriculture. PQS
(1994, June, pp. 19; 1994, December, pp. 10). —
c PQS (1994, June, pp. 19). EBRD
(1994)—' PQS (1994, December, pp. 35). —
8 EBRD (1993, 1994). GUS (1994, pp. 317),
KSH (1993, pp.31) -
hEBRD estimate (1994).31
Appendix III
Graph Al Labour Productivity, Real wage and Unemployment in Hungary
labour productivity U in percent
90:1 90:4 90:7 90:10 91:1 91:4 91:7 91:10 92:1 92:4 92:7 92:10 93:1 93:4 93:7 93:10 94:1 94:4 94:7 94:10
Real producer wage index: Average gross monthly nominal wage in industry deflated by producer price
index, 1989=100. — Real consumer wage index: Average gross monthly nominal wage in industry
deflated by consumer price index, 1989=100. Both series are seasonally adjusted. Labour
productivity: Seasonally adjusted industrial production per industrial worker (old classification, adjusted
series), 1989 =100. Note that starting from 1.1.93 (1.1.94) industrial employees refer to enterprises
with more than 20 (10) employees. — U: Unemployment rate in percent.
Source: KSH, var. issues, OECD (1994) and Planecon (1994).
Graph A2 Labour Productivity, Real Wage and Unemployment in Poland
U in percent
90:1 90:4 90:7 90:10 91:1 91:4 91:7 91:10 92:1 92:4 92:7 92:10 93:1 93:4 93:7 93:10 94:1 94:4 94:7 94:10 95:1
Real producer wage index: Average gross monthly nominal wage in industry deflated by producer price
index, 1989=100. — Real consumer wage index: Average gross monthly nominal wage in industry
deflated by consumer price index, 1989=100. Both series are seasonally adjusted. In 1990-1991 data
refer to net wage.— Labour productivity: Measured as sold production index per one industrial worker,
1989=100. Sold production of industry cover industrial enterprises with more than 5 persons
employed.— U: Unemployment rate in percent. Note that the classification system of unemployment is
verified starting from January 1994. Unemployment rate in the graph above is 0,7 points lower than
reported in GUS (1994.1-1994.1).
Source: GUS, var. issues, Planecon (1994), OECD (1994).32
Appendix IV
The test for weak exogenity is based on the following regressions (Ho: vit_, = 0 against Hi:
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A single * (double**) asterisk indicates that the F-test rejecting weak exogeneity is significant
at the 5(1) percent level.33
Appendix V
Test for unit productivity:
Test for equal coefficient on labour input and output:
Test for constant returns of scale:
Test for unit elasticity of substitution:
Test for unit price wedge:
Ho: a2 = 1
Ho: 05= -0(6
Ho: d = 1
Ho:o= 1
Ho: a, = 1
H,: a2 *1.
Hi: a5 ^ -0(6
rii'. u T^ 1.
rli'. o ^t 1
H,: a,*l

































































































A single * (double**) asterisk indicates that the F-test is significant at the 5 (1) percent level.
" exp(-0.242) = 0.785.
 b marginal significance level.
c critical values: >.
2(1) ^0.05 =3.84, X\l) 0^.05 = 5.99, X
2(3) ^0.05= 7.81 ,^(4)^0.05= 9.49.
d U is taken from the Bewley transformation of the SEM.34











































































A single * (double**) asterisk indicates that the F-test is significant at the 5 (1) per-
cent level.
a exp(-O.3()5) = 0.737.
b marginal significance level.
c critical values: X
2( 1)0=0.05 =3.84, X,
2(2)^o.05 = 5.99, X
2(3) 0=0.05= 7.81, X
2(4) 0=0.05= 9.49.